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ABSTRACT

The author argues that morality can be taught in public schools without retreating into moral relativism and without compromising our cultural and constitutional principles of freedom of speech and the separation of church and state. The paper draws from philosophy and psychological theory to illustrate that concepts of the moral constitute a conceptual and developmental system distinct from concepts about other societal or religious values and that one's identification of the moral is independent of religious prescription. Research studies which illustrate these concepts are described. To prove that morality is independent of religious prescription, the author conducted a study with practicing Catholics. High school and college-age Catholics were asked to make a number of judgments about actions considered sins by the Catholic church. The results showed that the students' identification of actions as matters of morality is not a function of the presence of religious prescriptions. Morality is autonomous from religion, and the content of moral education (e.g., the issues of justice) may be universalized without compromising religious diversity among students. (RM)

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Can Morality be Separated From Religion in
the Teaching of Values?

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This paper was presented at the Annual Meeting of the American Education
Research Association, New York, March 19, 1982.

The 1980 presidential election re-focused the attention of public school officials and the public at large on the "moral educational" agenda of the religious right. While liberals and many members of the educational establishment reflexively recoil at the demands of religious fundamentalists, it behooves them and all of us to recognize in these new requests to "put God in the classroom" an old and enduring theme that extends beyond the parochial scope of specific religious groups. That theme is the belief that morality and religion are inseparable. From the religionist point of view, removal of religion from the public schools is to divorce education from the teaching of the "moral good."

The fundamentalists are not alone, however, in their desire to bring morality into the schools. Poll after opinion poll has shown that over 80 percent of the American public wants its public schools to teach children moral values as well as the three Rs. The controversial aspect of this widely shared public wish is reflected in a series of court opinions regarding whether one can teach about morality without at the same time violating First Amendment freedoms and constitutional provisions regarding the separation of Church and state. A thorough treatment of these legal issues has been recently presented in a booklet by Patricia M. Lines of the Education Commission of the States (Lines, 1981).

My aim in this paper is not to dwell on those legal issues, but to question the very assumption that morality is the special purview of religion. It is my contention that the current controversy over the role of religion in moral education stems from two misconceptions. The first results from the failure to clearly differentiate the moral from non-moral forms of religious and social values. The second is the assumption that concepts of morality are dependent on a belief in God

or at minimum, knowledge of God's Commandments. In the course of this paper I will draw from philosophy and psychological theory and research to illustrate (a) that concepts of the moral constitute a conceptual and developmental system distinct from concepts about other societal or religious values, and (b) that one's identification of the moral is independent of religious prescription. On the basis of those arguments and supporting research findings I will present the case that morality can indeed be taught in public schools without retreating into moral relativism and without compromising our cultural and constitutional principles of freedom of speech and the separation of Church and state.

To begin a dispassionate discussion of the issue at hand, we need to clarify what is meant by the moral domain and to differentiate the moral from social or religious conventions. The distinction between morality and convention I wish to employ is contained in a model of social development presented by Elliot Turiel (1978a). The basic assumption of Turiel's developmental model is that children construct conceptions of morality out of interactions in the context of events that are qualitatively different from the kinds of interactions that lead to the construction of concepts about conventions.

Social conventions are defined in Turiel's model as consensually determined behavioral uniformities serving to coordinate interactions of persons participating in a social system. Examples of actions within the conventional domain include forms of address, modes of dress, sexual mores, and procedures for cultural observance such as rites of passage. These conventional uniformities are based on accepted usage and serve to maintain social organization. Long standing conventional prescriptions can assume great importance in the lives of individuals both as a means of

symbolic expression of group membership and as a generally accepted pattern of actions concordant with cultural definitions of the "good" person (Shweder, in press).

Social conventional acts in themselves are arbitrary, however, in that they are not intrinsically prescriptive. Alternative courses of action can serve similar functions. For example, some groups within the United States hold that crossing the legs at the ankles defines modest posture for seated women. This rule is arbitrarily designated in that an alternative posture (e.g. crossing the legs at the knees) could have (and has for some groups) been designated to serve the same function. Alternatively, the group could define sexual modesty differently such that women's seated posture could be more variable as is generally the case for men. Accordingly, in the conventional domain, only violations of implicit or explicit regulations are considered transgressions (such regulations being alterable by consensus). For example, it is no longer a transgression for Catholics to eat meat on Fridays.

The child's conceptions of the function and importance of convention, then, cannot be generated out of experiences with the acts themselves. For in the absence of a cultural or religious context there is no objective rhyme or reason for the existence of such behavioral standards. According to Turiel, the source of the child's knowledge of the shoulds and oughts of customary, conventional, and ritualistic behaviors must be abstractions out of experiences surrounding the normative status of actions (e.g. rules, adult directives). The child's reflective constructions coordinating these abstractions form the basis of her/his understanding of the structure and function of social conventional systems (Turiel, 1978a).

Morality is defined by Turiel (1978a) in terms of actions having intrinsic effects upon the rights or well-being of another or others. Thus, in contrast with social conventions, the propriety of moral actions is not dependent on the existence of social regulations. To illustrate Turiel's account of the source and content of moral understanding let me present the following event taken from data Maria Nucci and I gathered in observations of social interactions occurring in school settings (Nucci & Nucci, in press a).

During the luncheon recess two second grade girls are playing with a jump rope that one of them had brought to school. A group of three larger fifth grade girls go over to the younger children and start to take the jump rope away from them. The two younger girls struggle to keep the rope. One of them is crying "It's mine - it's mine." The older girls win the struggle (having shoved one of the younger girls to the ground) and begin playing jump rope.

The sequence of occurrences in this event resulted in harm and an injustice perpetrated by one group of children against another.

In constructing a set of concepts to account for the occurrences in this event the child's focus is upon an action sequence with intrinsic consequences for the well-being of another. Thus, Turiel (in press) suggests the child may construct a set of prescriptions about such an act through abstractions from the experience itself, rather than from knowledge of societal or religious norms, adult admonishments, or observations of role models. Such prescriptions result from the coordination

of two primary perceptions of the event: (a) the resulting consequences to the victim (i.e. the loss of personal property and attendant emotional upset), and (b) the perpetrators' reasons for engaging in the act.

Furthermore, Turiel states that one of the ways children may form judgments of moral necessity regarding such actions is through a comparison of engagement in the act with its non-occurrence. If the constructed consequences of its non-occurrence (e.g. the victim is not made unhappy, does not experience loss) is judged to be more desirable than the consequences of its occurrence, then the child will draw conclusions regarding how people ought to act in such circumstances (e.g. people ought not to steal from one another). In this manner, Turiel suggests that children construct their judgments about moral concerns for justice and right. It should be added that such judgments are constructed not only out of the child's experiences as the perpetrator, but also out of similar events where the child is the victim or third person observer.

To recapitulate, though moral prescriptions (e.g. regarding hurting and stealing from others) form part of our social organization, moral issues are neither arbitrary nor determined by cultural precepts or social consensus. The individual's moral prescriptions are determined by factors inherent in social relationships, as opposed to a particular form of social, cultural, or religious structure. Turiel (1978) maintains that in contrast with the individual's concepts about convention, which are structured by underlying concepts of social organization, the individual's understandings of morality are comprised of concepts regarding the welfare and rights of persons structured by underlying conceptualizations of justice.

Turiel's definition of the moral is consonant with distinctions drawn between the moral and non-moral in rationalist (formalist) ethics (Frankena, 1963; ~~Ware~~, 1952; Kant, 1959; Rawls, 1971). His moral theory differs, however, from earlier psychological descriptions (i.e. Piaget, 1932; Kohlberg, 1981) related to rationalist philosophy. In those earlier constructivist theories Piaget (1932) and later Kohlberg (1981) described moral development as a progression of stages in which moral judgment moves from lower (heteronomous, conventional) levels where morality (justice) and convention are undifferentiated to higher (autonomous, principled) levels where morality as justice is differentiated from and displaces convention as the basis for moral judgments. In contrast with Piaget and Kohlberg, Turiel, as we have seen, posits that morality rather than being differentiated out of convention at developmental end points comprises a conceptual and developmental system distinct from concepts about convention. Support for Turiel's distinct domains model has been provided by results of several recent studies. Nearly all of that research has focused on individual's notions of morality and convention in secular contexts. The interested reader can find detailed summaries of those studies in reviews by Elliot Turiel (in press) and myself (Nucci, 1982). At this point, let me briefly list the major findings that have been obtained in those studies before turning to a more thorough account of the results of a recent study examining the moral and conventional aspects of religious values.

Studies of the moral and conventional in secular contexts have demonstrated the following:

1. Moral transgressions are viewed as wrong
irrespective of the presence of governing rules,

while conventional acts are viewed as wrong only if they are in violation of an existing rule or standard (Damon, 1977; Davidson, Turiel & Black, 1981; Nucci, 1981; Nucci & Herman, in press, Nucci & Nucci, in press a; Nucci & Turiel & Gawrych, 1982; Smetana, 1980, 1981, 1982; Turiel, 1978a, 1978b; Weston & Turiel, 1980).

2. Individuals view conventional standards to be culturally relative and alterable, while moral prescriptions are viewed as universal and unchangeable (Turiel, 1978b; Nucci, Turiel & Gawrych, 1982).
3. The forms of social interaction in the context of moral events differ qualitatively from interactions in the context of conventions. Specifically, it was found that children's and adults' responses to events in the moral domain focus on features intrinsic to the acts (e.g. harm, justice), while responses in the context of conventions focus on aspects of the social order (e.g. rules, regulations, normative expectations). (Much & Shweder, 1978; Nucci & Nucci, in press a, in press b; Nucci & Turiel, 1978; Nucci, Turiel & Gawrych, 1982).
4. Individuals view moral transgressions to be more serious than violations of convention (Nucci, 1981; Nucci & Herman, in press; Smetana, 1980, 1981; Turiel, 1978b).

5. Prosocial moral acts are viewed as better or more positive than adherence to conventions (Smetana, 1980).

These studies have included subjects from three to twenty-five years of age. Yet, no age differences have been found in the criteria employed or in the tendencies of individuals to distinguish between the moral and the conventional. Similar findings have been reported for preschoolers and young adults alike. While the majority of these studies have been conducted in the United States, essentially the same results have been obtained with subjects in the Netherlands (Turiel, in preparation) and the Virgin Islands (Nucci, Turiel & Gawrych, 1982); thus demonstrating that the distinction between morality and convention is not limited to persons whose socialization experience are within mainland United States culture.

The research described thus far is consistent with the contention that the moral and conventional constitute qualitatively differing forms of social events which are differentiated by individuals at all ages. Other research has shown that conceptions of morality and convention follow distinct developmental patterns and sequences. (With regard to moral development see Damon, 1977; Enright, R., Franklin, L. & Manheim, L., 1980. With regard to the development of concepts about social convention see Turiel, 1978a).

Up to this point, I have discussed one of the central themes of this paper: that morality is distinct from other normative values. Before linking this theme with religious values I would like to address the other major concern of this essay which is the claim made by some religionists that morality is ultimately dependent on a belief in God.

The philosophic justification for the contrary position I wish to take, that morality is not dependent on a belief in God was first developed by Plato in the Euthyphro, and more recently formulated by Kai Nielson (1973). Nielson argues that one cannot say that one is morally obligated to engage in an action solely because it is commanded by God. This is because it is proper for someone to ask two logically prior questions (a) God commands X, but is X good?, and (b) Why should I obey God's command to do X? In both instances, the answer to the question presupposes a conception of the moral independent from one's belief in God. For instance, one could argue that one should follow God's commands because God is powerful and God punishes those who do not obey his will. This is sound prudential reasoning, but hardly moral. For "God commanded it" to have moral force it must at least be the case that God is good (Nielson, 1973, pg. 22). For the believer to know that God is good requires a logically prior criterion for the good. One could argue, as some Christians might, that goodness is inherent to the very meaning of God just as youngness is inherent to the meaning of infant. But this conception of God is neither universal nor necessary. The ancient Greeks for instance viewed many of their Gods as capricious or even malicious. Obedience to the will of the Gods was often either a matter of prudence or pre-ordained fate; again hardly moral reasons. Indeed, Nielson contends that Christian and other similar beliefs in God's inherent goodness establishes moral "goodness" as a criterion for Godness. That is, a being is not God, unless it is also good. Just as a dog is not a puppy unless it is also young. In this way, a set of logical relationships is established such that a conception of the good is necessary for one to identify and so worship God rather than the devil or some other

preternatural force.

While Nielson's view discounts revelation as a source of moral understanding, it is not a necessarily atheistic position. That is, Nielson's argument cannot be read as precluding God, or impugning belief in God. It is, for example, consistent with the Thomist doctrine of natural law which posits that moral principles (justice, beneficence) are known through reason rather than revelation. My reading of arguments like Nielson's is simply that morality is independent of religious prescription. I would like now to present the results of a study Linda Junker and I recently conducted with practicing Catholics in which we investigated that hypothesis.

In the study we asked our Catholic subjects to make a number of judgments about actions considered sins by the Catholic Church. Twelve of the actions were identified by us as matters of morality (i.e., issues of justice, harm to others), and twelve were identified as non-moral and primarily matters of convention. The twenty-four issues used in the study are listed in Table 1. Subjects were asked to make three kinds of judgments. First, they were asked to rate the seriousness of each transgression using a four point scale where 4 = very seriously wrong to 1 = not wrong at all. The remaining two judgments required subjects to employ criteria for identifying the moral (i.e. prescriptivity, universality) provided by formalist ethics. Subjects were asked to consider (a) whether it would be wrong or alright for the Pope in conjunction with the Bishops to remove various moral and conventional rules, and (b) if it would be wrong or alright for a Catholic to engage in a given behavior once the rule was removed. It should be pointed out that Catholic dogma

holds that the Pope has the ultimate authority to determine and interpret such issues for members of the Catholic faith.

Subjects in this study were sophmores attending religion classes at a Chicago Catholic high school and equal numbers of undergraduates attending teacher preparation courses at the University of Illinois at Chicago. A preliminary set of questions determined that both groups of subjects were devout Church goers and practitioners (87.6% of the University Catholics received Communion more than twice monthly; 92% at least once a month, which compares with 90% and 95.3% for the high school sample). In addition, nearly all of the subjects in both groups adhered to basic Catholic beliefs that Mary was a virgin at the time of Christ's birth, that Christ is God and arose from the dead, and that Peter was the first head of the Church.

With regard to subjects' judgments of the seriousness of transgressions we found that both the high school and college age Catholics rated the moral transgressions to be more serious than violations of Catholic conventions (high school moral $M = 3.55$, conventional $M = 2.28$, $t(99) = 21.09$, $p < .0001$; college moral $M = 3.65$, conventional $M = 1.85$, $t(99) = 27.79$, $p < .0001$). This finding occurred despite the fact that according to Catholic dogma, engagement in a number of currently prohibited conventional behaviors carry with them the same severe penalty (i.e., damnation) as engagement in prohibited moral acts. These data indicate that the Catholic subjects based their judgments of the greater seriousness of moral transgressions on criteria other than the punishments assumed by Catholic dogma. It is our view that these Catholics judged the moral transgressions to be more serious because of the intrinsic effects such actions such as hitting, stealing, slander, and rape have on the recipient of the act. This

interpretation is quite consistent with statements made by subjects in interview studies conducted in secular contexts in which they were asked to give reasons for their seriousness ratings (Nucci, 1981; Nucci & Herman, in press; Smetana, 1980, 1981). In those studies it was found that subjects judged moral transgressions to be more serious than conventional violations because the moral transgressions resulted in harm or injustice to another.

Findings for the high school and college age Catholic's responses to questions regarding the removal of Church rules are presented in Table 1.

 Insert Table 1 about here

As can be seen in the table, the overwhelming majority of the subjects (on average 91.6% high school; 98% university) viewed it as wrong for the Church authorities to remove rules governing moral transgressions such as hitting and stealing. In contrast, on average less than half of the high school (40.8%) and university (32.7%) Catholics viewed it as wrong for the Pope to remove the Church rules regarding conventional behaviors such as fasting prior to communion, the ordination of women, the use of contraceptives or engaging in premarital sex. These differences were statistically significant (high school, $F(1,22) = 137.21, p .0001$; university $F(1,22) = 213.66, p .0001$). The subjects' responses regarding whether or not it would be wrong to engage in the various actions once religious prohibitions were removed essentially paralleled the findings regarding the removal of the rules themselves. We conclude from these data, that to the extent that devout American Catholics grant the Pope and other religious leaders the authority to alter the standards for

"good" or "right" Catholic behavior, they extend this authority only to actions in the conventional domain. One possible explanation for this finding is that the majority of American Catholics, contrary to Church dogma, do not view the Pope as infallible in matters of faith. Our own data would tend to bear that out. Only 23% of our University sample and 28% of our high school subjects adhered to a belief in papal infallibility. These findings are in line with other surveys of American Catholic attitudes (NBC News, 1979). For the remaining quarter of our subjects, who professed a belief in papal infallibility, our findings may reflect an incredulity on their part that the Pope would make the error of removing Church rules governing moral actions. In either case our findings are in line with the assumption that subjects generate notions of the prescriptivity of moral actions independent of the dictates of religious authorities.

In the final part of the study subjects in each group were asked to indicate whether it would be wrong or alright for members of a religion other than Catholicism to engage in the behaviors if the other religion had no rules or laws governing the acts. These data are also summarized in Table 1. As can be seen in the table, the high school and Catholic subjects universalized the status of moral transgressions and viewed them as wrong for members of religions other than Catholicism. The percentages of subjects viewing moral transgressions as wrong under the other religion condition was not significantly different from the percentages of subjects who viewed it as wrong for Church authorities to alter rules regarding those same (moral) actions (on average 90.5% high school; 97% university). In contrast with moral issues, less than half of the Catholic subjects (on average 33.8% high school, 18.2% university)

were willing to universalize Catholic conventions and treat as wrong the engagement in such conventional actions by members of religions which do not regulate those behaviors. The tendency of the subjects to acknowledge the relativism of their Church's conventions is highlighted by findings that the percentages of subjects viewing the acts as wrong for members of another religion was significantly less than the percentages of subjects who viewed it as wrong for Catholics themselves to engage in the behaviors if the Pope removed the governing rules. In sum, the findings from this aspect of the study indicate that Catholics distinguish between Church conventions, which serve to organize the behaviors of persons who define themselves as Catholics, and those moral acts which have an intrinsic effect upon the rights or well-being of others Catholic and non-Catholic alike.

The relation among the three forms of judgments (seriousness ratings, rule alterability, act universality) subjects were asked to make was quite high. Spearman rank order correlations for subjects' treatment of individual items in response to aspects of the questionnaire ranged from .90 to .99. These exceptionally high correlations are consistent with our assumption that the three forms of judgment derived from ethical philosophy which were employed as criteria for identifying the moral in this study focused upon a common psychological dimension.

The summative data from Catholics we reviewed thus far provide a pattern consistent with the proposition that morality is independent of religious prescription. Before moving to my concluding arguments, however, I would like to focus on patterns in the data relevant to individual differences in persons' religious conservatism and variability in the treatment of

individual items that might present "grey" areas in the moral-conventional dichotomy. For the bulk of this discussion I will be referring to data presented in Tables 3 and 4. Each table was generated out of a relatively new application of Rasch scaling procedures (Masters, G., Wright, B. & Ludlow, L., 1981) previously used mainly for calibrating items for tests measuring intellectual performance. In this case the scaling procedure was used to generate an ordering of items according to subjects' perceptions of the alterability of governing rules (the tendency to say it would be okay for the Pope to remove the governing rule, Table 3), and act universality (the tendency to view an act as wrong for persons of another religion which has no rule regarding the act, Table 4). Tables 3 and 4 present plots of individuals along a continuum of religious conservatism (the tendency to treat rules as unchangeable, or acts as universally wrong). Individuals are plotted against item position on a scale of rule alterability (Table 3) or act universality (Table 4). The key for identifying individual items on the two tables is presented in Table 2.

One thing made apparent in Tables 3 and 4 which is corroborated in Table 1 is that there is essentially no overlap among items from the two domains. A second thing evidenced in the two tables is that, while there is variability among individuals in the tendency to classify items in terms of rule alterability or act universality, almost all of the variance is due to differences in the treatment of conventional items. Except for a few cases each of the subjects including the "liberals" treated each of the moral items as prescriptive and universal. With regard to the variance within the conventional domain, four items stick out as being particularly important and most

likely to be treated as if they were moral. Three of these: receiving communion without confession, going a year without receiving communion, not attending Mass on Easter or Christmas represent violations of behavioral patterns that are the sine qua non of Catholicism as a religion. As I mentioned earlier conventions, though not intrinsically prescriptive, can take on deep significance in the lives of individuals committed to participation within a given cultural system. For devout Catholics to decenter sufficiently to treat these three behaviors as arbitrary and variable is in a sense to ask them to treat Catholicism itself, at least in-so-far as these conventional regularities are concerned, as alterable and relative. That devout Catholics can acknowledge this is evidenced in the subjects' responses to the act universality questions (see table 4). It seems likely that in that context subjects were not asking themselves to "renounce" their own pattern of worship, but to acknowledge the Catholicism of those actions and the legitimacy of other religious patterns.

The fourth "grey" issue, homosexuality, is another matter entirely. While the act is not a matter of morality in that it does not meet our definition of morality as justice, it is likely that many subjects interpret the act of homosexuality as "unnatural" and not simply wrong because of social or religious standards. That the definition of sexual unnaturalness is largely consensual and cultural in origin is evidenced in the university students' treatment of the act as *okay* for persons of another religion if the religion does not prohibit homosexual behavior. Despite these data I hesitate to assume that homosexuality is treated by most people as a purely conventional issue. A more complete examination of individuals' notions of the propriety

of homosexuality is now being studied by Elliot Turiel (personal communication). For our present purposes it is sufficient to acknowledge that homosexuality is not a moral issue.

Finally, one lesson to be drawn from tables 3 and 4 is that our distinction between morality and convention does not mean individuals all necessarily agree on all aspects of religious values. Indeed, some of the subjects plotted on the two tables would make Jerry Falwell appear liberal. The tables also suggest that factors such as age and education may affect individuals' conceptions of their religious values. Table 4, for instance, graphically illustrates that the university sample was considerably more "liberal" than the high school students with regard to Catholic conventions. The two things most striking about these data in the final analysis, however, are (1) that individuals make a consistent set of distinctions between moral and non-moral religious values, and (2) that there is little variance in individuals' identifications of actions in the moral domain. These findings are in keeping with Turiel's definition of the moral. They are also consistent with the outcomes of each of the studies on moral and conventional reasoning conducted in secular contexts. Together with those earlier results, the findings of our present study with Catholics forms the empirical support for the contention that morality is distinct from other types of social values, and is independent from religion.

I began the paper with a question: Can morality be separated from religion in the teaching of values?, to which I can now answer with an emphatic yes! Morality as I have outlined in this paper is comprised of a set of non-arbitrary universal issues of justice, fairness and a resultant concern for the welfare of others. Our research with Catholics in conjunction with

earlier studies regarding secular values indicates that to the extent that religious values are moral, it is to the degree to which they address those universal, non-arbitrary issues of justice, and derivative concerns for beneficence. Likewise, to the extent that an educational program serves as moral education, it is to the degree to which it fosters the construction of increasingly adequate conceptions of justice, fairness and rights. Such an educational aim as Kohlberg (1981) and Dewey (1909) before him have stated is well within the constitutional framework of our democracy. It permits the public schools to contribute to children's moral development without succumbing to the relativists palliative offered up in the sixties where morality is reduced to "do your own thing."

As for religious education, it is of value in its own right, and should be taught in its own contexts (i.e., home, church, or private school). We should not, however, confuse the teaching of morality with the teaching of religion and in so doing hold the moral development of public school children hostage to particular creeds.

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Table 1

Percentages of High School and University Catholics Responding "It Would Be Wrong"
to Changeability and Relativity Questions Regarding Religious Rules

Type of Rule	Question		Question	
	Would it be wrong or all right for the Pope and Cardinals to drop the rule about the acts listed below? It would be wrong.....		Suppose that another religion, religion B, has no rules or laws about the acts listed below. Would it be wrong or all right for a member of religion B to do the acts listed below? It would be wrong.....	
Moral:	High School	University	High School	University
Hitting and Hurting	93	100	92	98
Rape	98	100	98	100
Murder	98	100	98	98
Kidnap and Ransom	97	100	94	98
Stealing	98	100	92	100
Damaging another's personal property (home)	90	100	94	98
Sell dangerous defective car to unsuspecting buyer	79	96	83	94
Slander	90	98	82	98
Betray another's personal secrets	90	96	92	94
Racial discrimination in hiring	72	89	75	84
Ridiculing a cripple	97	100	90	98
Allowing another to be punished for one's own misdeed	97	100	96	98

Table 1 (cont'd)

Type of Rule	Question		Question	
	High School	University	High School	University
Church Conventions:				
Not attend Mass (religious services) on Sunday	46	42	39	12
Eating 15 minutes before communion	38	34	19	12
Receiving communion without confession	50	47	45	35
Year without communion	57	38	36	14
Not attend Mass on Easter or Christmas	62	54	48	31
Ordaining Women	39	16	29	8
Sexual Conventions:				
Premarital sex	29	32	17	12
Masturbation	43	18	52	14
Birth control (the "pill")	22	16	27	8
Homosexuality	64	52	47	39
Divorce	18	31	22	27
Marital sex solely for pleasure	21	12	25	6

Note: $n = 25$ males and 25 females for each of the four groups.

Table 2

Key for Tables 3 and 4

Item Code	Item
Moral:	
M01	Hitting and hurting
M02	Rape
M03	Murder
M04	Kidnap and ransom
M05	Stealing
M06	Damaging another's personal property (Home)
M07	Sell dangerous defective car to unsuspecting buyer
M08	Slander
M09	Betray another's personal secrets
M10	Racial discrimination in hiring
M11	Ridiculing a cripple
M12	Allowing another to be punished for one's own misdeed
Conventional:	
C13	Not attend Mass (religious services) on Sunday
C14	Eating 15 minutes before communion
C15	Receiving communion without confession
C16	Year without communion
C17	Not attend Mass on Easter or Christmas
C18	Ordaining women
C19	Premarital sex between consenting adults
C20	Masturbation
C21	Birth control (the "pill")
C22	Homosexuality
C23	Divorce
C24	Marital sex solely for pleasure

Table 3

Distribution of Catholic Subjects as a Function
of Conservatism and Rule Alterability^a

High School			University		
Raw Score	Item	Subject Frequency ^b	Raw Score	Item	Subject Frequency
23		X			
22		X			
21	C19, C23, C24	X			
20	C21	XX	14		X
19		X		C24	
18	C14, C18	XXXX	13		X
17	C13, C20	XXXX		C20, C21	
16	C15	XXXXXXXX	12	C18	XX
15	C16	XXXXXXXXXXXX	11	C23	XXXX
14	C22	XXXXXXXX	10	C14, C19	XXX
13	C17, M10	XXX		C16	
12		XXXX	9	C13	XXXXXXXX
11	M07		8	C17, C22	XXXXXXXXXXXX
10			7		XXXXX
9					
8	M08, M09, M06	X	6		XXXXXX
				C15	
			5		XXX
7	M01				
6		X	4		XXX
5				M10	
4	M02, M11, M12		3		
3	M04			M09	
	M05, M03			M12	X
2			2	M08, M07, M06	
				M05, M04, M03	
1			1	M02, M01, M11	

Note: $n = 25$ males and 25 females for each group.

^aSubject conservatism is tendency to consider it wrong for the Pope to remove the governing rule. Higher score equals greater conservatism. Subject placement indicates tendency to consider alteration of rules governing items below that score as wrong. Rule alterability is tendency for subjects to view it as okay for Pope to remove the rule. Higher item score equals greater rule alterability.

^bEach X equals one subject.

Table 4

Distribution of Catholic Subjects as a
Function of Conservatism and Act Universality^a

High School			University		
Raw Score	Item	Subject Frequency ^b	Raw Score	Item	Subject Frequency
			19	C18	
			18	C24	XXX
			17	C13, C14, C19	XX
			16	C16, C20	X
22		X	15		XX
			14	C23	XX
21			13	C15, C17	XX
20	C14	X			XXXXX
19	C19, C24	XX	12	C22	XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX
18	C18, C21	XXXXX			
17	C13, C23	XXXXXX	11		
16	C15, C16	XXXXXXX			
15	C20	XXXXXXXXX			
14	C17	XXX	10		XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX
13	C22	XXXXXX			
12		XXXXXXX			X
11		XXXXXXXXX	9	M10	
10	M10				
9	M07, M08		8		X
8		X			
7	M11	X	7	M09	
6	M01, M05				
5	M04, M06		6	M07	X
			5		
4	M12		4	M01, M03, M06 M08, M11, M12	
			3		
3	M09		2		
2					
	M02, M03				
			1	M02, M05	
1		X			

Note: $n = 25$ males and 25 females for each group.

^aSubject conservatism indicated by score. Subject placement indicates tendency to consider items from that score and below to be universal wrongs. Item universality is the tendency for subjects to treat an act as wrong for members of another religion even if that religion has no rule regarding the act. Lower scores indicate greater likelihood of being treated as universal.

^bEach X equals one subject.